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Abstract:  Abstract:  Abstract:  Abstract:  Millions of people are killed or wounded by small arms each year. The aim of this 
study is to enhance our understanding of “missing” arms trade across countries. We proceed 
in two steps. First, we measure the extent of missing arms trade on the basis of official trade 
statistics.  We  construct  a  measure  of  the  gap  in  arms  trade  based  on  the  discrepancy 
between the value of arms exports reported by the exporting country and the value of arms 
imports recorded by the importing country. Second, we uncover the link between refugee 
movements and missing arms trade. Refugee flows, by reducing the ability of the receiving 
country  to  patrol  its  borders  and  its  customs,  are  found  to  be  correlated  with  arms 
smuggling  across  the  border  into  the  importing  country.  A  series  of  robustness  checks 
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1.  1.  1.  1. Introduction Introduction Introduction Introduction       
Millions of people are killed or wounded by small arms each year. According to a 
report by the UK's Department of International Development (2003), small arms and light 
weapons act as a “multiplier of violence”: the availability of arms escalates civil wars, puts at 
risk  people's  lives  and  instigates  violence.  The  aim  of  this  study  is  to  enhance  our 
understanding of missing arms trade across countries. We proceed in two steps: first, we 
measure  the  extent  of  missing  arms  trade  on  the  basis  of  official  trade  statistics.  We 
construct a measure of the gap in arms trade based on the discrepancy between the value of 
arms exports reported by the exporting country and the value of arms imports recorded by 
the importing country. Second, we show that missing arms trade is related to the degree of 
strain experienced by customs and borders on the importer side.  
In order to measure missing arms trade, we adopt a measure introduced by Fisman 
and Wei (2004) and applied by Javorcik and Narciso (2008) to measure tariff evasion. Using 
product level trade data between Hong Kong and China in 1998, Fisman and Wei show that 
the extent of missing trade is positively related to the tariff rate, thus suggesting a positive 
relationship  between  tariff  evasion  and  tariff  rates.  Javorcik  and  Narciso  (2008)  extend 
Fisman and Wei's findings, by demonstrating that the responsiveness of the trade gap to the 
tariff  rate  is  higher  for  differentiated  products,  i.e.  those  products  whose  value  is  more 
difficult to assess. Yang (2008a) provides evidence that pre-shipment inspections of imports 
can increase import duty collection, although partial pre-shipment inspection programs may 
induce importers  to  seek  alternative  duty-avoidance  methods (Yang,  2008b).  In  a  recent 
paper Fisman and Wei (2009) analyze the smuggling of antiques and cultural products and 
provide evidence of the existence of a correlation between the level of corruption of the 
exporting country and the level of art smuggling. This relation is greater for countries that 
are well endowed in export restricted cultural properties.  
This paper tries to answer the following question: what happens if we consider a 
product which is valuable and potentially dangerous like small arms and light weapons? We 
expect that the extent of missing trade in arms will depend on factors other than the tariff 
rate, for example, on the level of strain experience at the border. We provide evidence that 
refugee flows, by reducing the ability of the receiving country to patrol its borders and its 
customs, may ultimately lead to an increase in missing trade in arms across the border into 
the importing country. 
Illegal arms trade is still an unexplored field, due to the difficulty of measuring the 
extent of it. In a recent paper, DellaVigna and La Ferrara (2010) analyze illegal arms trade 3 
 
by  focusing  on  eight  countries  under  UN  embargoes.  The  authors  propose  a  method  of 
detecting illegal arms trade which relies on stock prices fluctuations around 18 events that 
increase  or  decrease  the  extent  of  conflict  hostilities.  If  the  arms  producing  company  is 
trading illegally, then its stock price should reflect the increase or decrease in the demand for 
illegal arms. The authors do not find any evidence overall, apart from those companies based 
in countries with a lower governance level. 
This paper also contributes to the emerging literature on refugees and civil wars. 
Salehyan and Gleditsch (2006) argue that refugee movements increase the likelihood of a 
civil  conflict  in  the  host  country.  The  authors  suggest  that  refugee  flows  might  expand 
rebels’ networks and are likely to be responsible for the spread of arms in the receiving 
country. Along similar lines, Buhaug and Gleditsch (2008) analyze the spatial pattern of civil 
war and investigate the extent of contagion effects across countries. The authors show that 
civil war contagion is likely to take place in situations where there exist ethnic links with 
groups in a neighboring country. Refugee movements have also been found to be one of the 
most relevant factors in the spread of malaria. Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2007) provide 
evidence of a positive relationship between refugees coming from tropical countries and the 
incidence of malaria in refugee receiving countries. The authors conclude that preventing 
civil wars and therefore limiting forced population movements will help reducing malaria 
transmission as well. 
We adopt a similar measure as in Fisman and Wei (2004) in order to assess the 
extent of missing arms trade. We create a bilateral dataset reporting the value of small arms 
exports and the value of small arms imports for all available country pairs. We use official 
arms trade figures to build a measure of missing trade in arms for each country pair, by 
year. The trade gap in arms trade is measured as the difference between the value of arms 
exports from country i to country j, as reported by country i, minus the value of imports 
from country i to country j as reported by country j. As we are interested in analyzing the 
route followed by refugees, we consider the exporting country to be the country from which 
refugees originate from, and the importing country to be the refugees’ host country. The 
findings support our prior: the presence of refugees indirectly decreases the ability of the 
receiving country to patrol and control its own customs. This ultimately leads to an increase 
in  arms  illegally  smuggled  into  the  importing  country.  These  results  are  robust  also  to 
controlling for the governance and democracy levels of both the importing and exporting 
country. 4 
 
We conduct a series of robustness checks. A stable long term refugee population may 
have different implications than a sudden inflow. Therefore we focus on the impact of a 
change in the number of refugees on missing arms trade: refugee flows are found to have a 
positive  and  statistically  significant  impact  on changes  in the  arms  trade  gap. Next,  we 
analyze the role of borders, by focusing on landlocked countries and on the length of the 
border between each country pair, the rationale being that longer borders are more difficult 
to patrol. We provide evidence that the impact of refugee movements on arms trade gap is 
greater the longer the border and in landlocked countries. The robustness checks confirm our 
results and rule out other possible concurrent driving factors, like embargoes, tariff evasion 
and exchange rate fluctuations, which might affect missing trade. Finally, we test our results 
using plants as a placebo good. We conclude that, given the nature of small arms and light 
weapons, greater attention should be paid to customs functioning in periods of distress. 
This study is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the data. Section 3 explores 
the relationship between refugee movements and “missing” arms trade. The robustness checks 
are presented in Section 4. Finally, Section 5 concludes. 
 
2.  2.  2.  2. Data Data Data Data       
There  exist  two  main  sources  of  data  on  arms  transfers:  national  official  exports 
reports and official trade statistics. However, according to the Small Arms Survey (2004) 
“National export reports, which are published mainly for reasons of transparency, are at time 
less transparent on arms trade than international customs data, which were not designed as 
an arms trade transparency device”.
  1 About 30% of UN members lack any regulation on 
arms exports, while approximately 10% of UN members provide official reports on small 
arms  exports  and  exports  licenses,  although  the  presentation  of  the  data  vary  very 
significantly. Most countries require the parties involved in arms transactions to apply for an 
import/export license and in some cases to apply for a use and end-user (government or 
private)  license.  This  information  should  be  recorded  by  national  authorities.  Licenses, 
however, do not always act as a reliable source of information. Often the quantity indicated 
on the license is different from the quantity actually exported, and there might not be any 
record on whether the delivery has actually taken place. Besides, some countries allow for 
open  licenses,  which  do  not  report  any  information  regarding  the  quantity,  the  actual 
delivery and the end-user (Holtom, 2008).  
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Our main data source for arms flows is the World Bank's World Integrated Trade 
Solution  (WITS)  database.  WITS  reports  bilateral  trade  flows  data  on  the  basis  of 
UNCTAD's COMTRADE. Customs data present some shortcomings as well: countries may 
not  report  the  destination  of  their  arms  exports  or  they  report  the  value,  but  not  the 
quantity of small arms imported or exported. However, according to the Small Arms Survey 
(2002)  the  great  advantage  of  using  customs  data  relies  on  the  comparability  across 
countries.  We  collect  data  on  bilateral  exports  and  imports  of  small  arms,  category  93 
according  to  the  6-digit  Harmonized  System  (1988/92),  for  all  countries  and  all  years 
available.
2 Trade data are expressed in thousands of current US dollars. UNCTAD collects 
the data from local authorities either in current US dollars or in local currency. Where trade 
values are expressed in local currency, a monthly exchange rate is applied to convert values 
into US dollars. We use the official arms trade figures to construct a measure of missing 
arms trade for each available country pair, by year.
3  
Our measure of missing arms trade is measured as the difference between the value of 
small arm a exported from country i to country j, as reported by country i, minus the value 
of small arm a imported from country i to country j as reported by country j. In some cases 
imports and exports are not matched, i.e. the exporting country might report exports of a 
certain arm category, while the importing country does not report any value for that specific 
category. In this case we input zero import value for the missing category, thus assuming 
that complete smuggling takes place. Similarly, in case of a missing value of exports for a 
certain category and in presence of import value, we impose zero for the missing export 
category. As we are interested in analyzing the route followed by refugees, we consider the 
exporting country to be the country refugees originate from, and the importing country to be 
the refugees’ host country. The missing arms trade measure is defined as follows: 
￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ln￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ 1￿ ￿ ln￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ 1￿ 
In the absence of arms smuggling, the difference between the value of exports, as 
reported by the exporter, and the value of imports, as reported by the importer, should be 
negative. In fact, import values include the cost of freight and insurance, while export figures 
are free on board (Javorcik and Narciso, 2008). As shown in the middle panel of Table 1, the 
mean discrepancy over the sample is indeed negative, i.e. the value of arms exports reported 
by the exporter is smaller than the value of arms imports recorded by the importer.  
Some concerns might arise regarding the reliability of export values: countries from 
which refugees migrate from are likely to be involved in a conflict. This might affect the 
                                                           
2 See Data Appendix for details. 
3 Note that military aid does not pass through customs (Small Arms Survey, 2002).  6 
 
extent to which exports are recorded. We tackle this issue in three ways. First, we control 
for the quality of democracy in both the sending and the receiving country, by using the 
Gastil index which measures political rights and civil liberties. Second, we control whether 
the sending or the receiving country are under UN or EU embargo. Finally, we argue that 
we would expect a country in turmoil, as the sending country is likely to be, to declare a 
lower value of exports, which would ultimately lead to a lower arms trade gap. 
According to Small Arms Survey (2003), about 98 countries in the world have the 
capacity of producing small arms and light weapons, or ammunitions. The majority of arms 
producers are located in Europe, the US, followed by Asia, South America, Middle East, and 
Sub Saharan Africa. The top arms exporters in our sample are Germany, US, Japan, United 
Kingdom, Saudi Arabia, the latter being mainly involved in transfers due to servicing and 
repairs. The top arms importers are US, Italy, France, and Germany. 
 
Table 1: Summary statistics Table 1: Summary statistics Table 1: Summary statistics Table 1: Summary statistics       
Variable  Mean  Min  Max 
       
Refugees  13,252  1  591,754 
Refugees from Neighboring countries 
 
4,259  0  350,104 
Arms Trade Gap (value)  -0.751  -11.578  11.423 
Arms Exports (‘000$)  447.990  0  151,336 
Arms Imports (‘000$)  560.511  0  144,601 
       
Sending countries (N=148)       
GDP per capita (2000US$)  7,719  80  38,551 
Population (000s)  64,382  71.212  1,296,157 
Gastil Index  3.17  1  7 
Corruption Perception Index  4.95  0.69  10 
       
Receiving countries (N=121)       
GDP per capita (2000US$)  9,127  118  38,551 
Population (000s)  44,834.53  273.7  1,288,401 
Gastil Index  2.88  1  7 
Corruption Perception Index  5.12  0.4  10 
       
 
Our  data  source  for  refugee  data  is  the  UN  Refugee  agency  (UNHCR).  UNHCR 
collects data from host countries on the number of refugees, by country of origin. According 
to UNHCR “refugees include persons recognized under the 1951 Convention relating to the 
Status of Refugees, its 1967 Protocol, the 1969 OAU Convention Governing the Specific 
Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa, those recognized in accordance with the UNHCR 
Statute, persons granted complementary forms of protection and persons granted temporary 7 
 
protection”.
 4 We create a bilateral dataset reporting the number of refugees yearly present in 
each country, by country of origin, for all available country pairs. The data set contains 
many  missing  observations  and  particular  attention  has  been  paid  on  how  to  treat  the 
missing data. A missing observation can indeed be interpreted as a true missing or as a zero, 
i.e. no refugee originating from a specific country. We drop the missing observations in our 
analysis, however we also perform two robustness checks: first, we replicate the empirical 
analysis by replacing missing observations with zeros; second, we aggregate over time and we 
conduct our empirical analysis using five-year averages instead of yearly data.
 5  
Our  final  data  set  covers  the  period  1988  to  2004  and  it  includes  121  receiving 
countries and 148 sending countries. The summary statistics for refugees are reported in 
upper panel of Table 1. The mean number of refugees in refugee receiving countries and 
territories is 13,505, of which about 4,341 come from neighboring countries. United States, 
Germany, Serbia and Montenegro, India, Malaysia, and Sweden appear to be the largest 
refugee receivers in our sample. However, when we focus on the largest refugee receivers from 
neighboring  countries,  the  main  receivers  are  Bosnia  Herzegovina,  Togo,  India,  Russia, 
Gabon, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Papua New Guinea, Croatia, Georgia, and Greece. Refugees 
mainly originate from Bosnia Herzegovina, Croatia, Serbia and Montenegro, China, Turkey, 
and Sri Lanka. The top senders to neighboring countries are: Bosnia Herzegovina, China, 
Turkey, Serbia and Montenegro, Azerbaijan, Togo, and Sudan. 
Finally, the lower panel of Table 1 presents the summary statistics of the control 
variables, i.e. real GDP per capita at constant 2000 US$ and population from the World 
Development Indicators;
  the Gastil index of democracy compiled by Freedom House; the 
governance level, measured by the Corruption Perception Index (CPI). Sending countries 
tend to have a lower GDP per capita, a lower level of democracy and a higher level of 
corruption than receiving countries.  
 
3.  3.  3.  3. Refugees and  Refugees and  Refugees and  Refugees and missing arms trade missing arms trade missing arms trade missing arms trade       
The presence of refugees may put pressure at the border and in customs, therefore 
reducing the ability of the receiving country to police and patrol its borders and its customs, 
thus  indirectly  leading  to  an  increase  in  the  illegal  arms  smuggling  into  the  receiving 
country. In this section and in the following one we provide evidence that missing trade in 
arms is higher the larger the presence of refugees. To this end, we focus on the impact of 
                                                           
4 UNCHR Statistical Yearbook (2006), page 2. 
5 Results are available from the author upon request. 8 
 
refugees originating from neighboring countries, rather than the total number of refugees 
present in a country. Table 2 reports the result of a simple exercise. We split the data on 
arms between countries with refugees coming from neighboring countries and states without 
refugees from neighboring countries. Both the mean and the median of arms trade gap are 
larger for those countries receiving refugees from neighboring countries and the difference is 
statistically different from zero.  
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*** p<0.01. 
 
Figure 1 presents the kernel density of arms trade gap for the two samples. The dash 
line represents the kernel density of arms trade gap for those countries without refugees from 
neighboring  states,  while  the  solid  line  represents  the  kernel  density  for  countries  with 
refugees from neighboring nations. Missing arms trade appears to be larger for countries 
hosting refugees from neighboring nations.  
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Next,  we  estimate  the  model  of  arms  trade  gap  as  a  function  of  the  number  of 
refugees.
6 The basic specification is as follows: 
 
￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ !￿"￿￿￿ ￿ ￿#$￿￿ ￿ ￿%!￿"￿￿￿ & $￿￿ ￿ ￿' (￿￿ ￿ '#(￿￿ ￿ )￿ ￿ *￿ ￿ +￿ ￿ ,￿￿￿￿        (1) 
 
where !￿"￿￿￿ is the natural logarithm of the number of refugees (plus 1) from country i to 
country j at time t; $￿￿ is the contiguity dummy variable taking value 1 if the two countries 
are adjacent, and 0 otherwise; (￿￿ represents the set of controls for the sending country i at 
time t, while (￿￿ is the set of controls for the receiving country j at time t. Among the 
controls, we consider the democracy level, measured by the Gastil index; the governance 
level, measured by the Corruption Perception Index (CPI); the natural logarithm of the real 
GDP per capita at constant 2000 US$; and the natural logarithm of population. Finally, )￿ 
represents exporter fixed effects, *￿ represents importer fixed effects and +￿ is the set of time 
dummies. We differentiate the impact of refugees on missing arms trade. Countries with 
better institutional set-ups and better quality of democracy are more likely to host refugees. 
Therefore we expect these countries to report their arm imports in a more accurate way, i.e. 
we  envisage  a  smaller  arms  trade  gap.  On  the  other  hand,  refugees  from  neighboring 
countries are more likely to negatively affect policing of the border, thus leading to more 
arms smuggling and a larger arms trade gap.  
The results, reported in Table 3, are consistent with our prior. Column 1 presents the 
basic specification which includes the number of refugees, the number of refugees interacted 
with the contiguity dummy variable, the contiguity dummy variable, real GDP per capita 
for both the sending and the receiving country, countries’ size as measured by population, 
exporter and importer fixed effects and time dummies. Forced population movements from 
neighboring countries have a positive and statistically significant impact, while the number 
of refugees is found to affect missing arms trade in a negative and statistically significant 
way. The marginal effect for refugees from neighboring countries is reported in the lower 
part of the table and is statistically significant at the 1% level. These findings support our 
prior: the presence of refugees originating from a neighboring country may reduce the ability 
of the host country to police its borders, thus leading to an increase of arms smuggled inside 
the country. A 1% increase in the number of refugees from adjacent countries leads to an 
increase of 7.9% in arms smuggling. 
                                                           
6 Due to the presence of large outliers, the top and bottom 1% observations are dropped from the 
sample. 10 
 
The  measure  of  missing  arms  trade  crucially  depends  on  the  quality  of  the 
institutions, both on the exporter and importer side. Therefore, in column 2 and 3 we include 
two  measures  of  governance.  Column  2  presents  the  results  of  the  specification  which 
includes  the  level  of  corruption.  Corruption  is  measured  according  to  the  Corruption 
Perception  Index  (CPI)  produced  by  Transparency  International.  The  CPI  index  is 
constructed on a “poll of polls”, based on business surveys and interviews to experts. Higher 
values of the CPI are associated with less corrupted countries. The index is time-varying and 
it is available starting from 1996. Refugees from neighboring countries have still a positive 
and statistically significant impact on missing arms trade. The corruption measure does not 
have  a  statistically  significant  impact  on  arms  trade  gap  for  either  the  sending  or  the 
receiving country.  
Next, we control for the democracy level in the importing and exporting country 
(column 3). Our measure of democracy is the Gastil Index of Civil Liberties and Political 
Rights compiled by Freedom House. The Gastil index takes values between 1 and 7, where 
lower values are associated with better democracies. Again, the number of refugees from 
neighboring countries has a positive and statistically significant impact on the level of the 
trade gap in arms flows. 
   11 
 
Table 3: Arms trade gap and refugees Table 3: Arms trade gap and refugees Table 3: Arms trade gap and refugees Table 3: Arms trade gap and refugees 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
VARIABLES  Arms Trade Gap 
             
REF*Contiguity  0.133***  0.106***  0.126***  0.145***  0.122***  0.138*** 
dummy  [0.026]  [0.029]  [0.026]  [0.028]  [0.031]  [0.028] 
             
REF  -0.053***  -0.058***  -0.052***  -0.060***  -0.058***  -0.058*** 
  [0.013]  [0.015]  [0.013]  [0.015]  [0.018]  [0.016] 
             
CPI — Receiving    0.035      0.053   
country    [0.071]      [0.073]   
             
CPI — Sending    0.086      0.076   
country    [0.053]      [0.054]   
             
Gastil Index -      -0.075      -0.171 
Receiving country      [0.104]      [0.108] 
             
Gastil Index -      0.047      0.046 
Sending country      [0.046]      [0.046] 
             
             
Marginal effect  0.079  0.049  0.074  0.084  0.064  0.080 
F-value  10.67  3.11  9.26  10.56  4.37  9.36 
P-value  0.001  0.078  0.002  0.001  0.037  0.002 
             
Sample  All  All  All  Reduced  Reduced  Reduced 
             
             
Observations  18132  14988  17829  17157  14077  16885 
Adjusted R-squared  0.216  0.208  0.214  0.217  0.210  0.215 
Each specification includes: Log(Real GDP pc) - receiving country, Log(Real GDP pc) - sending 
country, Log(population) - receiving country, Log(population) - sending country, contiguity dummy, 
importer fixed effects, exporter fixed effects, year fixed affects.   
Robust standard errors in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
 
Some countries in our sample receive no refugees at all. In order to focus on the 
actual impact of refugees on arms smuggling into the receiving country, we replicate the 
same specification above for a reduced sample, which includes only the refugees-receiving 
countries. The results, reported in columns 3 to 5 of Table 3, hold also for the reduced 
sample.  Again,  the  marginal  effects  of  refugee  presence  from  neighboring  countries  are 
positive and statistically significant as shown in the lower panel of Table 3.  
   12 
 
 
4.  4.  4.  4. Robustness checks Robustness checks Robustness checks Robustness checks       
In  this  section,  we  discuss  a  series  of  robustness  checks.  First,  we  consider  a 
specification in first differences. Then we focus on the role of borders. If the presence of 
refugees does affect the ability of a country to patrol its borders, we would expect the length 
of the border or whether the country is landlocked to affect the extent of missing arms trade. 
We also test for other possible concurrent driving factors, like embargoes, tariff evasion and 
exchange  rate  fluctuations,  which  might  affect  missing  arms  trade.  Finally,  we  examine 
whether the same results hold for a placebo good. All of these robustness checks confirm that 
refugee  movements  are  positively  related  to  arms  smuggling  into  the  refugee  receiving 
country.  
 
4. 4. 4. 4.1 1 1 1       First differences First differences First differences First differences       
The first robustness check consists of estimating the model in first differences. We 
analyze the impact of a change in our measure of arms trade gap as a function of the change 
in the number of refugees coming from neighboring countries. We expect that a stable long 
term refugee population may have different implications than a sudden inflow, therefore an 
increase in refugee flows from neighboring countries should lead to a positive change in the 
arms trade gap. Column 1 of Table 4 reports the results of the basic specification in first 
differences.  Refugee  flows  from  neighboring  countries  do  appear  to  have  a  statistically 
significant impact on the change in the arms trade gap, while no effect is found for refugees 
flows originating from non-neighboring countries. The same results hold when we control for 
the change in the democracy index for both the sending and receiving country. Excluding 
those countries that do not face any change in the number of refugees over time does not 
affect the results (columns 3 and 4).  
   13 
 
 
Table 4: Arms trade gap and refugees. Specification in first differences Table 4: Arms trade gap and refugees. Specification in first differences Table 4: Arms trade gap and refugees. Specification in first differences Table 4: Arms trade gap and refugees. Specification in first differences 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
VARIABLES  ∆  Arms Trade Gap 
         
∆ REF*Contiguity   0.399**  0.411**  0.492***  0.505*** 
dummy  [0.169]  [0.169]  [0.182]  [0.182] 
         
∆ REF  -0.054  -0.064  -0.077  -0.087 
  [0.083]  [0.084]  [0.088]  [0.088] 
         
∆ Gastil Index -     -0.041    -0.049 
Receiving country    [0.087]    [0.098] 
         
∆ Gastil Index -     0.220    0.222 
Sending country    [0.150]    [0.232] 
         
Marginal Effect  0.344  0.346  0.414  0.417 
F-value  5.54  5.61  7.21  7.32 
P-value  0.019  0.018  0.007  0.007 
         
Sample  All  All  Reduced  Reduced 
         
         
Observations  8813  8693  6284  6207 
Adjusted R-squared  0.002  0.002  0.008  0.007 
Each specification includes:  ∆ Log(Real GDP pc) - receiving country,  ∆ Log(Real GDP pc) - sending country, 
∆ Log(population) - receiving country,  ∆ Log(population) - sending country, contiguity dummy, importer fixed 
effects, exporter fixed effects, year fixed affects.  
Robust standard errors are listed in parentheses. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
 
4. 4. 4. 4.2 2 2 2       The role of borders The role of borders The role of borders The role of borders       
In  order  to  analyze  what  happens  at  the  border,  we  need  more  disaggregate 
information  on  customs,  immigration  and  detailed  information  on  arms  transportation. 
Unfortunately detailed customs information is not available for the large set of countries in 
our sample. By focusing on refugees from neighboring countries, we are implicitly assuming 
that  refugees  reach  the  destination  country  by  land.  Cases  of  refugees  reaching  the 
destination country by boat, as in the case of Malta, Italy and Yemen, are therefore ruled 
out. A similar issue arises for the way arms are transported. It is important to remark that 
the arms into consideration are small arms and light weapons, which, given the size, are 
more  easily  smuggled.  In  order  to  understand  whether  the  presence  of  refugees  is  really 
interfering with customs controls, we proceed in two steps. First, we focus on landlocked 
countries, therefore allowing for the possibility that arms are transported by lorry or by 
airplane and excluding shipment by boat. Second, we control for the length of the border 
between each country pair. Columns 1 and 2 of Table 5 show the results for the specification 14 
 
which controls for landlocked refugee receiving countries. The impact of refugees on missing 
arms trade is larger when the receiving country is landlocked. This result holds also when we 
control for the democracy index of both the receiving and the sending country (column 2).  
 
Table 5 Table 5 Table 5 Table 5: Arms trade gap, refugees and the role of borders : Arms trade gap, refugees and the role of borders : Arms trade gap, refugees and the role of borders : Arms trade gap, refugees and the role of borders 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
VARIABLES  Arms Trade Gap  ∆  Arms Trade Gap 
                 
REF  -0.041***  -0.039***  -0.052***  -0.051***         
  [0.013]  [0.013]  [0.013]  [0.013]         
                 
REF*  0.065***  0.056**             
Landlocked  [0.025]  [0.026]             
                 
Gastil Index     -0.063    -0.074         
Receiving country    [0.103]    [0.104]         
                 
Gastil Index     0.055    0.046         
Sending country    [0.046]    [0.046]         
                 
REF*Length      0.017***  0.016***         
of border      [0.004]  [0.004]         
                 
∆ REF          -0.046  -0.051  -0.042  -0.052 
          [0.082]  [0.082]  [0.083]  [0.083] 
                 
∆ REF*           0.334*  0.319*     
Landlocked          [0.193]  [0.194]     
                 
∆ Gastil Index             0.228    0.220 
Receiving country            [0.151]    [0.150] 
                 
∆ Gastil Index             -0.036    -0.040 
Sending country            [0.086]    [0.087] 
                 
∆ REF*Length              0.045**  0.046** 
of border              [0.022]  [0.022] 
                 
Observations  18132  17829  18132  17829  8813  8693  8813  8693 
Adjusted R-squared  0.215  0.213  0.216  0.214  0.002  0.002  0.002  0.002 
Specifications  in  columns  1  and  2  include:  Log(Real  GDP  pc)  -  receiving  country,  Log(Real  GDP  pc)  -  sending  country, 
Log(population) - receiving country, Log(population) - sending country, contiguity dummy, importer fixed effects, exporter fixed 
effects, year fixed affects. Specifications in columns 3 and 4 include:  ∆ Log(Real GDP pc) - receiving country,  ∆ Log(Real GDP 
pc) - sending country, ∆ Log(population) - receiving country, ∆ Log(population) - sending country, contiguity dummy, importer 
fixed effects, exporter fixed effects, year fixed affects.  
Robust standard errors in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
 
Columns 3 and 4 report the results of the specification which includes an interaction 
term between the number of refugees and the length of the border measured in kilometres for 15 
 
each country pair.
7 We expect that the longer the border, the more difficult policing, the 
greater the impact of refugees on arms smuggling. The results support our prior (column 3). 
A  similar  effect  is  found  when  we  control  for  the  level  of  democracy  (column  4).  The 
estimated coefficient of the interaction between border length and refugees is positive and 
statistically significant at the 1% level.  
In line with the robustness check reported in Section 4.1, columns 5 to 8 present the 
results for the role of borders in the first differences specification. The estimation results 
confirm our findings: the impact of an increase in forced population movement on the change 
in the arms trade gap is larger for landlocked countries and for countries sharing longer 
borders. 
 
4. 4. 4. 4.3 3 3 3       Three scenarios Three scenarios Three scenarios Three scenarios       
The evidence so far points in the direction of a relationship between refugee flows 
and missing trade in arms. The aim of this section is to answer the following question: why 
does the presence of refugees lead to a larger trade gap in small arms? We could think of 
three possible scenarios. In the first scenario refugees demand arms with the intention to 
return to their country of origin to conquer it back. According to the second scenario, which 
is the one we have put forward in the previous sections, refugee flows make the borders 
porous and therefore facilitate arms smuggling. Finally, in the third scenario the presence of 
refugees creates informal networks and hence facilitates arms smuggling. The aim of this 
section is to test which of the three different scenarios is supported by the data.  
Table 6 reports the estimation results of the first test. If the first scenario holds, i.e. 
refugees demand arms to take back their country, we should observe that what matters is 
the overall presence of refugees, rather than the number of refugees from the arms exporting 
country. Therefore, the main regressor in columns 1 and 2 is the natural logarithm of the 
total number of refugees in the importing country (plus 1), independently of the refugees’ 
country of origin. The estimated coefficient of the variable Total Refugees is not statistically 
significant either in the basic specification (column 1) or in the one which includes the Gastil 
Index among the controls (column 2). Similar results hold when we consider the specification 
in first differences, presented in columns 3 and 4. We do not find any evidence supporting 
the first scenario: the change in the total number of refugees present in a country does not 
have a statistically significant impact on the change in the arms trade gap.  
                                                           
7 Source: CIA Factbook. 
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Table 6:  Table 6:  Table 6:  Table 6: Arms trade gap Arms trade gap Arms trade gap Arms trade gap       and total number of refugees and total number of refugees and total number of refugees and total number of refugees 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
VARIABLES  Arms Trade Gap  ∆  Arms Trade Gap 
         
Total Refugees  0.012  0.008     
  [0.016]  [0.016]     
         
Gastil Index     -0.037     
Receiving country    [0.104]     
         
Gastil Index     0.052     
Sending country    [0.046]     
         
∆ Total Refugees      -0.005  -0.004 
      [0.008]  [0.008] 
         
∆ Gastil Index         -0.087 
Sending country        [0.095] 
         
∆ Gastil Index         0.176 
Receiving country        [0.145] 
         
Observations  18132  17829  11129  10958 
Adjusted R-squared  0.215  0.212  0.012  0.012 
Specifications in columns 1 and 2 include: Log(Real GDP pc) - receiving country, Log(Real GDP pc) - sending 
country, Log(population) - receiving country, Log(population) - sending country, contiguity dummy, importer 
fixed effects, exporter fixed effects, year fixed affects. Specifications in columns 3 and 4 include: ∆ Log(Real GDP 
pc) - receiving country,  ∆ Log(Real GDP pc) - sending country,  ∆ Log(population) - receiving country,  ∆
Log(population) - sending country, contiguity dummy, importer fixed effects, exporter fixed effects, year fixed 
affects.  
Robust standard errors in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
 
Table 7 presents the results of the tests for the second and third scenario. According 
to the second scenario the presence of refugees makes the borders porous during the influx 
time. However, we would expect borders to get sealed by the host country at a later stage 
and we would foresee a decrease in the impact of the refugees on missing arms trade. On the 
other hand, if the third scenario holds, i.e. refugees create informal networks and facilitate 
arms smuggling, such effect should not decrease over time.  
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Table 7:  Table 7:  Table 7:  Table 7: Arms trade gap Arms trade gap Arms trade gap Arms trade gap       and lagged refugee flows and lagged refugee flows and lagged refugee flows and lagged refugee flows 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
VARIABLES  Arms Trade Gap  ∆ Arms Trade Gap 
         
Lagged REF*Contiguity  0.080**  0.074**     
dummy  [0.032]  [0.032]     
         
Lagged REF  -0.059***  -0.057***     
  [0.015]  [0.015]     
         
Gastil Index     -0.045     
Receiving country    [0.124]     
         
Gastil Index     0.063     
Sending country    [0.051]     
         
Lagged ∆ REF*      0.069  0.056 
Contiguity Dummy      [0.090]  [0.091] 
         
Lagged ∆ REF      -0.045  -0.047 
      [0.034]  [0.034] 
         
∆ Gastil Index         -0.001 
Receiving country        [0.176] 
         
∆ Gastil Index         0.019 
Sending country        [0.106] 
         
Marginal Effect  0.021  0.016  0.024  0.009 
F-value  0.50  0.29  0.08  0.01 
P-value  0.481  0.589  0.779  0.919 
         
         
Observations  14468  14227  7545  7423 
Adjusted R-squared  0.222  0.220  0.017  0.015 
Specifications in columns 1 and 2 include: Log(Real GDP pc) - receiving country, Log(Real GDP pc) - sending 
country, Log(population) - receiving country, Log(population) - sending country, contiguity dummy, importer 
fixed effects, exporter fixed effects, year fixed affects. Specifications in columns 3 and 4 include: ∆ Log(Real GDP 
pc) - receiving country,  ∆ Log(Real GDP pc) - sending country,  ∆ Log(population) - receiving country,  ∆
Log(population) - sending country, contiguity dummy, importer fixed effects, exporter fixed effects, year fixed 
affects.  
Robust standard errors in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
 
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 7 report the specification in levels, which is similar to the one in 
equation 1, apart from the two lagged variables: number of refugees, Lagged REF, and the 
lagged number of refugees from neighboring countries, Lagged REF*Contiguity dummy. The 
estimated coefficients are smaller than the ones with the results presented in Table 3. The 
number of refugees from the arms exporting country has a negative relationship with the 
missing  trade  in  arms.  However,  we  cannot  reject  the  hypothesis  that  the  sum  of  the 
coefficients on Lagged REF and Lagged REF*Contiguity dummy is zero. Columns 3 and 4 of 
Table 7 report the results for the specification in first differences. We consider the lagged 18 
 
change in the number of refugees instead of the current change in the number of refugees, as 
in Table 4. None of the estimated coefficients is statistically significant. The effect of refugee 
influx on missing trade in arms appears to be contemporaneous. This result is in line with 
the second scenario: the presence of refugees puts pressure at the border and makes it more 
difficult for the host country to patrol its customs at the time the refugee influx takes place. 
Such effect disappears over time, as shown in Table 7. 
 
4. 4. 4. 4.4 4 4 4       Embargoes Embargoes Embargoes Embargoes       
Countries under embargo should be excluded from arms trade. We consider both UN 
and EU embargoes and we build a dummy variable, embargo, which takes value 1 if either 
the UN or the EU has imposed an embargo on the specific country. Seven countries in our 
sample report arms imports, notwithstanding the embargo: Bosnia Herzegovina, Serbia and 
Montenegro, Croatia, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sudan, China. The countries that officially reported 
arms exports to the embargoed countries are: Albania, Bosnia Herzegovina, Croatia, India, 
Iran, Macedonia, Pakistan, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Togo, Turkey, Uganda, Serbia, and South 
Africa. Similarly, the countries under embargo that report arms exports are: China, Angola, 
Bosnia Herzegovina, China, Croatia, Indonesia, Macedonia, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sudan, Sierra 
Leone, Slovenia, Serbia, South Africa, Congo (Zaire), and Zimbabwe. The list of countries 
that receive arms from embargoed countries is much diversified. 
Table 8 presents the results. The main findings hold when we control for embargoes: 
an increase in the number of refugees is related to an increase in the arms trade gap, both 
when we focus on the specification in levels and in first differences. The estimated coefficient 
on  the  embargo  dummy  variable  for  the  sending  country  is  positive  and  statistically 
significant. We interpret this result as showing that the importing partner is either another 
embargoed country, or a non-embargoed country which conceals its arms imports from an 
embargoed country.  
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Table 8: Arms trade gap, refugees and embargoes Table 8: Arms trade gap, refugees and embargoes Table 8: Arms trade gap, refugees and embargoes Table 8: Arms trade gap, refugees and embargoes 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
VARIABLES  Arms Trade Gap  ∆ Arms Trade Gap 
         
REF*Contiguity  0.133***  0.127***     
Dummy  [0.026]  [0.026]     
         
REF  -0.052***  -0.052***     
  [0.013]  [0.013]     
         
Gastil Index     -0.074     
Receiving country    [0.105]     
         
Gastil Index     0.021     
Sending country    [0.050]     
         
Embargo — Receiving  -0.877**  -0.522  0.335  0.476 
country  [0.349]  [0.354]  [1.137]  [1.002] 
         
Embargo — Sending  0.595***  0.304*  0.437*  -0.016 
country  [0.154]  [0.177]  [0.254]  [0.252] 
         
∆ REF*Contiguity      0.398**  0.415** 
Dummy      [0.170]  [0.169] 
         
∆ REF      -0.051  -0.064 
      [0.084]  [0.084] 
         
∆ Gastil Index         0.221 
Receiving country        [0.151] 
         
∆ Gastil Index         -0.042 
Sending country        [0.089] 
         
Marginal Effect  0.080  0.075  0.347  0.350 
F-value  10.83  9.53  5.58  5.71 
P-value  0.001  0.002  0.018  0.017 
         
         
Observations  18132  17829  8813  8693 
Adjusted R-squared  0.216  0.214  0.002  0.001 
Specifications in columns 1 and 2 include: Log(Real GDP pc) - receiving country, Log(Real GDP pc) - sending 
country, Log(population) - receiving country, Log(population) - sending country, contiguity dummy, importer 
fixed effects, exporter fixed effects, year fixed affects. Specifications in columns 3 and 4 include: ∆ Log(Real GDP 
pc) - receiving country,  ∆ Log(Real GDP pc) - sending country,  ∆ Log(population) - receiving country,  ∆
Log(population) - sending country, contiguity dummy, importer fixed effects, exporter fixed effects, year fixed 
affects.  
Robust standard errors in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
 
4. 4. 4. 4.5 5 5 5       Is it about  Is it about  Is it about  Is it about exchange rates exchange rates exchange rates exchange rates? ? ? ?       
The value of exports and imports is reported in US dollar. One possibility is that the 
effect on missing arms trade is due to exchange rates fluctuations, which might be correlated 20 
 
to refugee flows. We control for this possibility by inserting in the specification importer-year 
and  exporter-year  fixed  effects,  which  capture exchange  rate  fluctuations  over time.  The 
results hold, but are not reported.  
 
4. 4. 4. 4.6 6 6 6       The role of tariffs The role of tariffs The role of tariffs The role of tariffs       
Fisman and Wei (2004) and Javorcik and Narciso (2008) provide evidence of the 
relationship between the trade gap and the tariff rate. To this end, we include the tariff rate 
on arms in the specification outlined in equation 1. Our prior is that arms are valuable in 
themselves, therefore we do not expect the tariff rate to affect small arms trade gap. The 
estimation results are presented in Table 9. The coefficient on Tariff is never statistically 
significant either in the specification in levels or in the one in first differences. The effect of 
refugees on arms trade gap is still positive and statistically significant at the 5% level, also in 
the  specification  in  first  differences.  A  change  in  the  number  of  refugees  coming  from 
neighboring country is related to a positive change in the arms trade gap of the refugee 
receiving country.  
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Table 9: Arms trade gap, refugees and tariffs Table 9: Arms trade gap, refugees and tariffs Table 9: Arms trade gap, refugees and tariffs Table 9: Arms trade gap, refugees and tariffs 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
VARIABLES  Arms Trade Gap  ∆ Arms Trade Gap 
         
Tariff  0.013  0.014     
  [0.011]  [0.011]     
         
REF*Contiguity   0.183***  0.186***     
Dummy  [0.053]  [0.053]     
         
REF  -0.049**  -0.051**     
  [0.023]  [0.023]     
         
Gastil Index     -0.488***     
Receiving country    [0.183]     
         
Gastil Index     0.016     
Sending country    [0.080]     
         
∆ Tariff      -0.011  -0.012 
      [0.012]  [0.012] 
         
∆ REF *Contiguity       0.404**  0.405** 
Dummy      [0.199]  [0.199] 
         
∆ REF      -0.086  -0.088 
      [0.114]  [0.115] 
         
∆ Gastil Index         0.126 
Receiving country        [0.239] 
         
∆ Gastil Index         0.015 
Sending country        [0.133] 
         
Marginal Effect  0.134  0.135  0.317  0.317 
F-value  7.12  7.23  3.85  3.85 
P-value  0.008  0.007  0.050  0.050 
         
         
Observations  7024  6952  3609  3584 
Adjusted R-squared  0.194  0.195  0.004  0.004 
Specifications in columns 1 and 2 include: Log(Real GDP pc) - receiving country, Log(Real GDP pc) - sending 
country, Log(population) - receiving country, Log(population) - sending country, contiguity dummy, importer 
fixed effects, exporter fixed effects, year fixed affects. Specifications in columns 3 and 4 include: ∆ Log(Real GDP 
pc) - receiving country,  ∆ Log(Real GDP pc) - sending country,  ∆ Log(population) - receiving country,  ∆
Log(population) - sending country, contiguity dummy, importer fixed effects, exporter fixed effects, year fixed 
affects.  
Robust standard errors in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
 
4. 4. 4. 4.7 7 7 7       A placebo product A placebo product A placebo product A placebo product       
If arms smuggling is more likely when there is pressure at the border, as in the case 
of refugee flows, what happens if we consider an alternative product? Should we expect to 22 
 
observe an increase in smuggling of other products as well? The answer depends on the 
product type. Arms have a value in itself, therefore we expect missing trade in arms to be 
greater the more porous borders are. To this end we compare our results with those of a 
product which has very different features than arms. We introduce as placebo product the 
product category 06 of the HS1988/92: live trees and other plants, bulbs, roots and cut 
flowers. We replicate the specification outlined in equation 1, with plant trade gap as the 
new dependent variable. Columns 1 and 2 of Table 9 present the results for the specification 
in levels for this product. The number of refugees coming from neighboring countries has a 
positive effect on the trade gap in flowers and plants and the marginal effect is statistically 
significant at the 1% level. Next, we control for the tariff level. We expect the incentive of 
smuggling or underreporting the value of imports to be higher the higher the tariff rate. The 
impact of the tariff level is in line with previous findings in the tariff evasion literature: a 1% 
increase in the tariff rate leads to a 0.3% increase in the flower trade gap. The impact of the 
number of refugees from neighboring countries remains statistically significant at 1%. In the 
next two columns, we consider the specification in first differences, which capture the change 
rather than impact in levels. The results on refugees do not appear robust: the estimated 
coefficient on refugee flows is not statistically significant and we cannot reject the hypothesis 
that refugee flows have no impact on the change in flowers and plants smuggling. Column 4 
presents the specification which includes the tariff rate. A change in the tariff rate positively 
affects the change in the plants missing trade. Again, the impact of refugee flows on plants 
missing trade is not statistically significant.  
What can we conclude from these results? The type of product matters. Unlike arms, 
plants are not valuable, therefore we expect tariff evasion, rather than pure smuggling, to 
have a greater role for this type of products.  
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Table 10: Plants trade gap, refugees and tariffs Table 10: Plants trade gap, refugees and tariffs Table 10: Plants trade gap, refugees and tariffs Table 10: Plants trade gap, refugees and tariffs 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
VARIABLES  Plants Trade Gap  ∆ Plants Trade Gap 
         
REF*Contiguity  0.182***  0.182***     
Dummy  [0.038]  [0.038]     
         
REF  0.006  0.005     
  [0.018]  [0.018]     
         
Tariff    0.003*     
    [0.002]     
∆ REF      -0.069  -0.069 
      [0.053]  [0.053] 
         
∆ REF *Contiguity       -0.048  -0.052 
Dummy      [0.117]  [0.117] 
         
∆ Tariff        0.004* 
        [0.002] 
         
Marginal Effect  0.188  0.187  -0.117  -0.121 
F-value  24.10  23.78  1.27  1.35 
P-value  0.000  0.000  0.259  0.246 
         
         
Observations  5532  5532  2879  2879 
Adjusted R-squared  0.213  0.214  0.001  0.001 
Specifications in columns 1 and 2 include: Log(Real GDP pc) - receiving country, Log(Real GDP pc) - sending 
country, Log(population) - receiving country, Log(population) - sending country, contiguity dummy, importer 
fixed effects, exporter fixed effects, year fixed affects. Specifications in columns 3 and 4 include: ∆ Log(Real GDP 
pc) - receiving country,  ∆ Log(Real GDP pc) - sending country,  ∆ Log(population) - receiving country,  ∆
Log(population) - sending country, contiguity dummy, year fixed affects. Due to the smaller sample size exporter 
and importer fixed effects are excluded from columns 3 and 4. Inclusion of importer and exporter fixed effects 
deteriorates the adjusted R-squared without affecting the results. 
Robust standard errors in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
 
5.  5.  5.  5. Conclusions Conclusions Conclusions Conclusions       
 
The aim of this study is to enhance our understanding of arms smuggling across 
countries. We use the official arms trade figures to build a measure of “missing” arms trade 
for each available country pair, by year. The trade gap in arms trade is measured as the 
difference between the value of arms exports from country i to country j, as reported by 
country i, minus the value of imports from country i to country j as reported by country j. 
We show that missing trade in arms is related to the degree of strain experienced by customs 
and borders on the importer side. The findings support our prior: the presence of refugees 
indirectly  decreases  the  ability  of  the  receiving  country  to  patrol  and  control  its  own 
customs. This ultimately leads to an increase in arms illegally smuggled into the importing 24 
 
country. These results are robust also when we control for the governance and democracy 
levels  of  the  importer  and  exporter  country.  A  series  of  robustness  checks  support  our 
findings  rule  out  other  possible  concurrent  driving  factors.  We  conclude  that,  given  the 
nature  of  arms,  greater  attention  should  be  paid  to  customs  functioning  in  periods  of 
distress. 
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Data  Data  Data  Data Appendix Appendix Appendix Appendix       
 
 
Arms Arms Arms Arms:  6-digit  1988/92  HS.  The  arms  categories  included  are:  930100  Military 
weapons, other than revolvers, pistols; 930200 Revolvers and pistols, other than those of 
heading No 93.01; 930310 Muzzle-loading firearms; 930320 Shotguns including combination 
shotgun-rifles sportive; 930330 Rifles, sporting, hunting or target-shooting; 930390 Firearms 
and similar devices operated by the firing; 930400 Other arms, excluding those of heading No 
93.07;  930510  Parts  and  accessories  of  revolvers  or  pistols;  930521  Shotgun  barrels  of 
Heading  No  93.03;  930529  Parts  and  accessories  of  shotguns  or  rifles;  930590  Parts  and 
accessories  of  heading  No  93.01;  930610  Cartridges  for  riveting  or  similar  tools;  930621 
Cartridges,  shotgun;  930629  Air  gun  pellets  and  parts  of  shotgun  cartridges;  930630 
Cartridges  and  parts  thereof;  930690  Munitions  of  war  and  parts  hereof  and  other 
ammunition; 930700 Swords, cutlasses, bayonets, lances and similar arms and parts. Institute for International Integration Studies
The Sutherland Centre, Trinity College Dublin, Dublin 2, Ireland